University of Wisconsin Milwaukee

UWM Digital Commons
Health Informatics & Administration Faculty
Articles

Health Informatics & Administration

11-1-2019

Strategic Differentiation of High-Tech Services in Local Hospital
Markets
Hanh Q. Trinh
James W. Begun

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/healthinfo_facart
Part of the Health and Medical Administration Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Health Informatics & Administration Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.

882591

research-article2019

INQXXX10.1177/0046958019882591INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and FinancingTrinh and Begun

Original Research

Strategic Differentiation of High-Tech
Services in Local Hospital Markets
Hanh Q. Trinh, PhD1

INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care
Organization, Provision, and Financing
Volume 56: 1–8
© The Author(s) 2019
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
https://doi.org/10.1177/0046958019882591
DOI: 10.1177/0046958019882591
journals.sagepub.com/home/inq

and James W. Begun, PhD2

Abstract
This study assesses organizational and market factors related to high-tech service differentiation in local hospital markets.
The sample includes 1704 nonfederal, general acute hospitals in urban counties in the United States. We relate organizational
and market factors in 2011 to service differentiation in 2013, using ordinary least squares regression. Data are compiled
from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey of Hospitals, Area Resource File, and Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services. Results show that hospitals differentiate more services relative to market rivals if they are larger than the
rival and if the hospitals are further apart geographically. Hospitals differentiate more services if they are large, teaching, and
nonprofit or public and if they face more market competition. Hospitals differentiate fewer services from rivals if they belong
to multihospital systems. The findings underscore the pressures that urban hospitals face to offer high-tech services despite
the potential of high-tech services to drive hospital costs upward.
Keywords
hospital services, differentiation of services

What do we already know about this topic?
Unfettered hospital differentiation can contribute to escalating hospital expenditures, and past studies have identified
several factors that are associated with higher degrees of hospital differentiation, most notably higher market
competition.
How does your research contribute to the field?
We introduce a new measure of hospital differentiation, based on service offerings relative to each market rival, and we
include multihospital system membership as an independent variable in our model.
What are your research’s implications towards theory, practice, or policy?
Relatively promising from the standpoint of public policy and practice is the finding that multihospital system membership is associated with lower levels of differentiation, suggesting that system membership may create some counterbalance to forces associated with higher differentiation of services.

Introduction
High health care expenditures are a chronic problem in the
United States. The high price of large numbers of sophisticated, high-technology (high-tech) services is a major contributor to US health care expenditures.1,2 At the same time,
convenient access to high-tech services improves hospital
performance in the eyes of consumers. Controlling expenditures while assuring convenient access to high-tech services
are conflicting public policy goals. Unfettered access to hightech services, sometimes described more broadly as a “medical arms race,” is counter to efficient distribution of health
care resources.3,4 It is important to identify forces that drive a
potential “medical arms race” around high-tech services.

We analyze forces associated with high-tech service offerings from the perspective of hospitals’ strategic choices
about differentiation. Differentiation has been described as
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“the ability to develop the right number, type, and distribution of services, programs, and products.”5 Differentiation
around service offerings is particularly suitable in markets in
which customers are not price-sensitive. Many hospital markets lack price sensitivity for a variety of reasons, including
lack of transparency of prices, payment through third-party
insurance, and oligopolistic markets.6-8
There are many ways to differentiate hospital services.
Hospitals can emphasize the quality of their services, their
high levels of patient satisfaction, or their centers of excellence around particular disease categories, such as women’s
health or cardiac care. Past studies of hospital differentiation
have measured differentiation by the quantity and mix of services offered by a hospital.7,9,10 For example, a widely used
taxonomy of health systems uses breadth of tertiary acute
services, breadth of long-term/chronic care services, and
number of community orientation activities as measures of
differentiation.7,9,11 One study, by Luft and colleagues7 measures service offerings relative to similar “peer group” hospitals. We follow the approach of Luft and colleagues7 but
consider service offerings relative to competitor hospitals,
rather than “peer group” hospitals. We conceptualize differentiation as a difference in service offerings between a focal
hospital and its competitors, measuring the number of services a focal hospital offers but each of its competitors does
not. This allows for a fine-grained measure based on dyadic
comparisons.
Past studies have identified several factors that are associated with higher degrees of hospital differentiation, most notably higher market competition.7,8 It is important to establish
(or not) that this finding holds in more recent times. Past studies have not included multihospital system membership in the
analytic models. We include multihospital system membership in our model. In addition, it is important to know whether
new measures of differentiation, such as the one used here
measuring differentiation relative to rivals, affect results.

Conceptual Model and Hypotheses
Several market and organizational characteristics can be
expected to influence the decision to differentiate hospital
services from those of rivals. We examine 7 of those characteristics, chosen for their explanatory power as well as their
managerial and public policy relevance. We also include 5
control variables in our conceptual model.
First, geography plays a role in differentiation of services.
Far distances serve as an effective geographical barrier to
competition, sorting out real from potential competitors.12,13
When there are no nearby competitors, hospitals do not face
a direct competitive threat, as local residents have no choice
but to use their services. In contrast, when hospitals are geographically close to one another, the level of competitive
threat is more likely to be so intense that it prompts hospitals
to differentiate services.14 For these reasons, we hypothesize
the following:

INQUIRY
Hypothesis 1: Hospitals differentiate more services from
other hospitals in their market area if their location is geographically closer.
Size is a critical organizational characteristic driving an
organization’s strategy and its outcomes.15,16 Hospitals with
larger bed size tend to have more resources and better quality
outcomes and thus have the ability to adapt or develop strategies around their service offerings.17 Larger hospitals tend to
offer more elective services.4 We hypothesize that larger hospitals are better equipped to offer differentiating services.
Hypothesis 2: Larger hospitals differentiate more services from other hospitals in their market area.
Size is important not only in an absolute sense; it is important in relationships with competitors. Asymmetrical relationships between rivals exist when one organization uses its
resources and capabilities to dominate a relationship with a
rival.18,19 Usually the dominant firm has more resources and
capabilities and can position itself in a way to maximize the
capabilities that distinguish it from its competitors.20,21 We
therefore hypothesize the following.
Hypothesis 3: Hospitals with greater size relative to hospitals in their market area differentiate more services from
those hospitals.
Due to their mission to serve the public, private nonprofit
hospitals and public hospitals may be expected to offer more
services to consumers, ceteris paribus, which in turn means
that they have more differentiated services.8 Nonprofit hospitals can distribute any profits by providing unprofitable
services instead of distributing profits to shareholders.22 We
anticipate public or nonprofit ownership to result in more
differentiation.
Hypothesis 4: Nonprofit and public hospitals differentiate more services from other hospitals in their market
area.
Hospitals that join multihospital systems with multiple
members in a local community may have better strategic
coordination with other members of their system in the same
community. In this way, system members are able to avoid
direct competition and configure their services more effectively, with fewer differentiated services than hospitals without membership. This is particularly true for local hospital
clusters in urban areas.23-25 National systems with single hospitals in a community would not be subject to this coordination incentive.
Hypothesis 5: Hospitals in multihospital systems differentiate fewer services from other hospitals in their market
area.
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Hospitals that are affiliated with medical schools are
likely to need sophisticated technology to meet the training
needs of medical schools, particularly of specialist physicians. Teaching hospitals offer advanced clinical capabilities,
care for disadvantaged urban populations, and lead in
research and innovation, all of which increase the pressures
for differentiation.26,27
Hypothesis 6: Teaching hospitals differentiate more services from other hospitals in their market area.
Other characteristics of the market are likely to influence
the degree to which hospitals differentiate their services.
Among those pressures is market competition, which
prompts hospitals to protect or expand their market share
with service differentiation.3,4,8,28,29 We expect that more
competitive markets will encourage hospitals to offer hightech services that their rivals do not offer.
Hypothesis 7: Hospitals under greater competitive pressure differentiate more services from other hospitals in
their market area.
We also use 5 control variables that likely affect the choice of
differentiation as a strategy but are not of central interest in this
study: case mix index, population density, community wealth,
physician specialist density, and Medicare beneficiary density.
Although we do not test hypotheses, we expect high values of
these organizational and environmental characteristics to make
differentiation a more feasible strategy. Markets with higher
population density, case mix, consumer wealth, physician
specialists, and potential consumers of specialized services
should be more attractive locations for the strategy of hightech differentiation.

Methods
Sample and Data Set
In this study, the unit of analysis is a nonfederal, general
acute hospital in an urban county, which represents the local
market. The choice of county to define local market is less
than ideal, as many markets for high-tech services can be
expected to cross county boundaries. Nevertheless, the
county can provide a first approximation of results and is
common in the study of hospital markets.30 “Urban” is
defined as an area located inside the United States Census
Bureau’s “Core Based Statistical Areas” (CBSAs). The data
on service differentiation are drawn from the 2013 American
Hospital Association’s (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals
file. Data on organizational characteristics and environmental factors derive from the 2011 AHA Annual Survey of
Hospitals file and the 2011 Area Resource File, and the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The 2-year
period between organizational and environmental factors

and differentiation should allow time for hospitals to adjust
their strategy of differentiation.
The data set consists of 1704 general acute hospitals,
compared with a total of 2861 general acute hospitals in
2013 in urban counties. There are 2 reasons for this difference. First, 809 hospitals are sole hospitals that do not exercise a strategy of service differentiation because there are no
other hospitals in their county. Second, 348 hospitals are
reported as acute in the AHA file but as nonacute in CMS
data files. They were excluded from the sample.

Measurement: Dependent Variable
Differentiation is measured by pairing one hospital with each
of its potential competitors one at a time. With each pairing,
differentiation is the number of high-tech services that a focal
hospital has but its potential competitor does not. This measurement makes it possible to understand which environmental
pressures or organizational characteristics are associated with
the way hospitals seek to differentiate from some hospitals, but
not others. We include 40 services (see Table 1) reported in the
AHA annual survey data file that require high technology, such
as organ transplant, magnetic resonance imaging, cardiac surgery, robotic surgery, to capture a wide range of services. They
are the type of services used by hospitals in their efforts to differentiate themselves from competitors.28,31,32
The algorithm first creates all possible pairs of hospitals in
each county, and then counts the number of services the focal
hospital offers that each of its potential competitors do not.
The number of possible pairs is the number of permutations
(P) on n hospitals located in the same county, taken 2 hospitals
(r = 2) at a time in the following mathematical expression.33
n Pr =

n!
( n − r )!

With this approach, the number of permutations increases
substantially with an increase in the number of pairs of hospitals within the same county. For example, there are 2 permutations (AB and BA) with 2 hospitals A and B in the same
county, 6 permutations (AB, BA, BC, CB, AC, and CA) with
3 hospitals A, B, and C, and so on. The original data in a vector form with 1704 hospitals were transformed into a new
data set with a matrix form using the Structured Query
Language (SQL) procedure in SAS to produce 11 264 possible pairs in which a focal hospital is paired with each of its
competitors in the same community.
Because the permutation of a set of hospitals by definition
is an ordered sequence, AB and BA are 2 different permutations. Within each permutation, the first hospital is treated as
a focal one, and the second is its potential competitor.
Services provided by these 2 hospitals are compared to identify which services the second hospital does not provide.
These services are the ones that differentiate the focal hospital from the potential competitor. For example, suppose
Hospital A provides services 1-7, while Hospital B offers
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Table 1. Hospital High-Tech Services.

Measurement: Independent Variables

1. MRI
2. Diagnostic radioisotope facility
3. Optical colonoscopy
4. Full-field digital mammography
5. Multislice spiral computed tomography 64+ slice
6. Endoscopic retrograde
7. Adult diagnostic/invasive catheterization
8. Single photon emission computerized tomography
9. Adult interventional cardiac catheterization
10. Endoscopic ultrasound
11. Adult cardiac electrophysiology
12. ESWL
13. Robotic surgery
14. Adult cardiac surgery
15. IMRT
16. Ablation of Barrett’s esophagus
17. Esophageal impedance study
18. Image-guided radiation therapy
19. PET/CT
20. Shaped beam Radiation System
21. Stereotactic radiosurgery
22. PET
23. Computer-assisted orthopedic surgery
24. Virtual colonoscopy
25. Genetic testing/counseling
26. Tissue transplant
27. EBCT
28. Other transplant
29. Kidney transplant
30. Intraoperative MRI (IMRT)
31. Pediatric card electrophysiology
32. Bone Marrow transplant services
33. Pediatric diagnostic/invasive catheterization
34. Pediatric interventional cardiac catheterization
35. Pediatric cardiac surgery
36. MEG
37. Liver transplant
38. Heart transplant
39. Proton therapy
40. Lung transplant

Geographical distance. Geographical distance is the distance
between the focal hospital and each of its potential competitors. Geographic Information System (arcGIS) is used to calculate the straight line distance between pairs of hospitals.

Note. MRI = magnetic resonance imaging; ESWL = extracorporeal shockwave lithotripter; IMRT = intensity-modulated radiation therapy; PET =
positron emission tomography; CT = computed tomography; EBCT =
electron beam computed tomography; MEG = magnetoencephalography.

services 5-10. Then, Hospital A in permutation AB is differentiated by services 1-4, and Hospital B in permutation BA is
differentiated by services 8-10. Hospital A has a differentiation score of 4 in the AB pair, and Hospital B has a differentiation score of 3 in the BA pair.
The average number of differentiated services in all hospital pairs in this sample is 6.58 (see Table 3), meaning that
the average focal hospital has 6.58 services (out of the list of
40) that other hospitals in the county do not have. A higher
value for a focal hospital corresponds to higher differentiation of the focal hospital from other hospitals in the county;
a lower value means lower differentiation.

Hospital size. Hospital size is measured as the number of
staffed beds.
Size asymmetry. Size asymmetry is measured as a ratio of
staffed bed size of a focal hospital to the bed size of its potential competitor.
Ownership. Ownership status is measured with 1 representing nonprofit or public, and 0 representing for-profit.
Multihospital system membership. Membership is measured
with 0 representing no membership, and 1 representing
membership in a multihospital system. Systems include
local, regional, and national systems.
Teaching affiliation. Teaching hospitals are those with residency training approval by the Accreditation Council for
Graduate Medical Education or membership in the Council
of Teaching Hospitals of the Association of American Medical Colleges.
Local market competition. Local market competition is measured at the county level as 1 = Herfindahl-Hirschman index
(HHI), which is the sum of the squared proportions of each
hospital’s admissions to total admissions within the same
county.

Control Variables
Case mix index. A hospital’s case mix index represents the
average diagnosis-related group (DRG) relative weight for
that hospital. It is calculated by summing the DRG weights
for all Medicare discharges and dividing by the number of
discharges.
Population density. Population density is the population of the
county in thousands divided by the area in square miles.
Community wealth. Community wealth is measured as
income in thousands divided by the population of the county.
Physician specialist density. Specialist density is total specialist
physicians per 1000 population in the county.
Medicare beneficiary density is the ratio of Medicare
recipients to the county population.
Measures and sources are summarized in Table 2.
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Table 2. Variables, Measures, and Sources.
Variables
Dependent variable
Differentiated services

Measures

Sources

Number of high-tech services that a focal hospital
provides while its potential competitor does not

Independent variables
Geographic distance

Log of distance in miles between focal hospital and
its potential competitor
Bed size
Log of staffed beds
Size asymmetry
Log of ratio of hospital bed size over its potential
competitor
Nonprofit/public ownership
0: no, 1: yes
Multihospital system membership 0: no, 1: yes
Teaching affiliation
0: no, 1: yes
Market competition
1: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) within county
Control variables
Case mix index
Medicare case mix index
Population density
Log of population of county in thousands divided by
areas in miles
Community wealth
Log of per capita income in thousands within county
Specialist density
Log of number of physician specialists per 1000
population
Medicare beneficiary density
Log of number of Medicare beneficiaries per 1000
population

AHA Annual Survey

AHA Annual Survey; arcGeographic
Information System
AHA Annual Survey
AHA Annual Survey
AHA Annual Survey
AHA Annual Survey
AHA Annual Survey
AHA Annual Survey
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Area Resource File
Area Resource File
Area Resource File
Area Resource File

Note. AHA = American Hospital Association.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Study Variables (n = 11 264).

1. Differentiated services
2. Geographic distance in miles (log)
3. Power asymmetry (log)
4. Nonprofit/public ownership
5. Multihospital system membership
6. Bed size (log)
7. Case mix index
8. Teaching hospital
9. Market competition
10. Population density (log)
11. Community wealth (log)
12. Specialist density (log)
13. Medicare beneficiary density (log)

Mean

SD

1

2

6.58
2.29
.01
.75
.76
5.39
1.62
.39
.86
.58
3.86
.96
5.23

6.87 1.00
.97 −.03 1.00
1.21
.68 −.01 1.00
.43
.20 −.07 .20
.42 −.01 −.03 .06
.88
.50 −.13 .67
.26
.40 −.16 .20
.49
.36 −.24 .31
.14
.02 .33 −.01
1.12
.05 −.04 .00
.19
.03 −.02 .01
.43
.08 −.21 .01
.21 −.01 −.07 −.01

Analytic Method
To test the hypotheses, an ordinary least squares regression
analysis is used to estimate the relationship between independent variables and the level of hospital service differentiation. Variables with positively skewed distribution are
logged. Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for
all variables are reported in Table 3. A degree of correlation
is observed among some of the independent variables, pointing to a mild problem of multicollinearity, which is common
in multiple regression studies. The highest coefficients are

3

4

1.00
−.06
.35
−.04
.26
−.08
.05
.06
.17
.20

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1.00
.09 1.00
−.02 .24 1.00
.04 .50 .28 1.00
−.01 .09 .08 −.02 1.00
.00 .19 .07 .21 .55 1.00
−.03 .08 .05 .11 .21 .44 1.00
.01 .23 .09 .32 .14 .50 .58 1.00
.02 .10 −.14 .00 −.29 −.29 −.16 .07 1.00

the positive correlations between bed size and power asymmetry (.67) and between specialist density and community
wealth (.58). A test for multicollinearity showed the largest
variance indicator as 2.37, far less than 10, the value that
might raise concern if exceeded.

Findings
Results of the regression analysis are displayed in Table 4.
The probability of the fit of the whole model is .0001, indicating a strong fit of the data to the model.
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Table 4. Parameter Estimates (Gammas) for Effects of Independent Variables on Differentiated Services (n = 11 264).
Differentiated services
Hypothesized
Independent variables
Geographic distance
−
Bed size
+
Size asymmetry
+
Nonprofit/public ownership
+
Multihospital system membership
−
Teaching affiliation
+
Market competition
+
Control variables
Case mix index
Population density
Community wealth
Specialist density
Medicare beneficiary density
a: Significant at the 0.05 level
b: Significant at the 0.01 level
c: Significant at the 0.001 level
Adjusted R2 = 0.5419; F = 1110.97; P < .0001; n = 11 264

The regression results indicate the effects of organizational characteristics and environmental pressures on service differentiation. Of the 7 hypotheses, 6 are supported,
as 6 variables are related to differentiation as hypothesized:
size asymmetry, nonprofit/public ownership, multihospital
system membership, bed size, teaching affiliation, and market competition. However, geographic distance among hospitals is positively related, rather than negatively related, to
differentiation.
Control variables all are significantly related to differentiation, with case mix, population density, specialist density,
and Medicare beneficiary density all positively related to differentiation, but community wealth negatively related to
differentiation.

Discussion
The results of the empirical analysis largely support the
conceptual model and hypothesized relationships between
organizational and market characteristics and hospital
high-tech service differentiation. Hospitals vary their levels of high-tech service differentiation based on their relationships with rivals and their own structural characteristics,
including their size, teaching and ownership status, and
system membership. The positive associations of size and
teaching affiliation with differentiation are not surprising,
given the increased likelihood that high-tech services will
be in demand in larger hospitals and in teaching hospitals.
Nonprofit and public hospitals have higher incentives to
pursue service differentiation than for-profit hospitals.
They are more likely than for-profit hospitals to offer

Actual unstandardized coefficients (standard errors)
0.293 c (0.051)
0.309 c (0.078)
3.329 c (0.049)
1.069 c (0.112)
−0.610 c (0.102)
1.473 c (0.109)
0.874 a (0.444)
6.940 c (0.182)
0.061 (0.057)
−0.873 b (0.291)
0.120 b (0.044)
0.007 a (0.002)

services that may not be profitable, given the secondary
primacy of the profit motive in their strategic decisionmaking (relative to for-profit hospitals). They also may
perceive more pressure to respond to specialized consumer
demand, given their service mission.
Relatively promising from the standpoint of public policy is the finding that system membership is associated with
lower levels of differentiation relative to rivals. System
members may be less pressured to attain a wide range of
high-tech services because those services are provided by
other system members. Hospitals that join multihospital
systems are unlikely to add more services to their current
portfolio if their members within the same market are willing to share services with them.34 This interpretation is
complicated by the fact that other system members may or
may not be considered “rivals” in the traditional sense. Our
data do not distinguish rivals that are same-system members from rivals that are not.
The findings indicate that hospital strategic behavior
also is associated with the hospital’s relationships with
potential rivals, including the level of market competition.
One dimension of these relationships is the geographic distance from rivals. We hypothesized that hospitals differentiate more services from nearby hospitals. However, the
results suggest that geographic proximity between hospitals is associated with lower rather than higher service differentiation. There are 2 interpretations for how this result
may emerge over time: (1) rationalization of services over
a wide geographic area or (2) imitation. Regarding the first
interpretation, the need for a specific high-tech service
increases if a focal hospital is distant from other hospitals
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offering that service. For example, an outlying hospital in a
county is more likely to offer a service if it is more distant
from a cluster of central city hospitals that already offer that
service. Regarding imitation, nearby hospitals that compete
with one another may imitate the differentiation strategy of
a competitor. As all hospitals one by one continue adding
more services over a period of time, they unintentionally
turn the process of differentiation into a process of duplication. However, pressures for imitation are less intensive
when hospitals are geographically far apart. The imitation
interpretation is consistent with institutional theory in
which hospitals tend to copy each other’s strategy35 and
also is consistent with the medical arms race phenomenon,
whereby hospitals compete with each other by imitation in
the adding of new services.3,4,29
In addition, size asymmetry is associated with the decision to differentiate services. With larger bed size relative to
a rival, hospitals usually have more resources not only in
materials such as high-tech equipment, but also in human
capacity with knowledge and skills to use the equipment. As
explained by resource dependence theory, these resources
are a source of power over other organizations.36 With these
extra resources, larger hospitals are able to select services of
their choice that bring more revenues and expand market
share without fear of imitation from smaller rivals. They can
take advantage of their dominant position to expand their
market share with service differentiation.
From the standpoint of public policy, as noted in the introduction, it is important to identify forces that drive a potential medical arms race around high-tech services. We have
identified structural factors (size, teaching affiliation, nonprofit/public ownership, independent hospital status) and
market relationships (market competition, size relative to
rivals) that are associated with higher differentiation of services. Any assessment of the public policy effects of higher
differentiation needs to use research designs that better assess
causality and that include information on costs, prices, and
quality.

2013, particularly with the advent of value-based purchasing
by insurers. While many properties of the markets remain
stable (eg, consolidation into systems, oligopoly, nonprice
competition), the strategic choice of differentiation faces
new market imperatives today.
Additional variables would strengthen the conceptual
model. One market characteristic we did not include is the
ability of hospitals to set high prices in their markets.
Although, likely, this is associated with high market share, it
may be a distinctive explanatory variable. Our measure of
geographic distance could be improved by the use of travel
time rather than straight line mileage. Finally, our high-tech
services list was culled by the authors from the AHA list of
services to represent perceptions in 2013. The items on our
list would be improved if they were more comprehensive and
mutually exclusive, weighted by volume or cost, and updated
to realities of the new marketplace.

Limitations and Future Research

ORCID iD

There are several limitations to the present study. The use of
county to define local market area is one important limitation. More sophisticated analyses would address the different
geographic reach of different services and different hospitals, and the situation of hospitals located near county borders.37 The county provides a very rough approximation of a
high-tech service area. Future analysis also should refine the
measure of multihospital system membership, particularly to
take into account the differences among local, regional, and
national systems. Second, as noted above, the use of a crosssectional design constrains the understanding of causality.
Longitudinal studies would offer a better understanding of
the causes and effects of the strategy of service differentiation.38 Hospital markets have changed substantially since

Hanh Q. Trinh

Conclusion
This study offers a better understanding of hospital competition in local markets where a few rivals compete for the
same clients with similar services. By comparing a hospital’s services with each of its potential competitors one at a
time, this study is able to better examine the complex nature
of services differentiation. The findings underscore the
roles of market competition, geographical proximity, and
size asymmetry as hospitals strategize about service differentiation in the effort to be a dominant player in the oligopolistic market.
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